I. Introduction
Economic theory predicts that a minimum-wage hike decreases employment of low-skill workers in the covered sector. Theory also suggests that a minimum-wage hike affects the equilibrium wage and the level of employment in the uncovered sector though, as pointed out by Mincer (1976) , the directions of the uncovered-sector effects are ambiguous.
On the one hand, if the absolute labor demand elasticity is relatively small so that firms eliminate only a few covered jobs after the wage hike, then workers find the minimum wage attractive enough to justify the risk of unemployment while searching for jobs in the covered sector. In this case labor leaves the uncovered sector, and the wage thereby increases. On the other hand, if the MINIMUM WAGE 531 in the average wage (A W/W) is no less than the share (s,) of low-wage labor in total labor costs; if the substitution effect is zero, then A W/W equals s,. The regional estimates of AW/W from the regressions turn out to be very close to regional estimates of si derived from independent wage distribution data. This can happen only if the major impact of a minimum-wage hike is the scale effect and not the substitution effect. Since the scale effect dominates, the observed proportionate decline in total employment must be close to the proportionate decline in low-wage employment; that is, the aggregation bias is small in the covered sector.
The importance of the scale effect together with the cost-share data can explain why there are regional differences in the demand elasticity. The size of the scale effect depends upon the increase in the marginal cost of production caused by a hike in the minimum wage. Sinces, is 0.14 in the North and 0.32 in the South, the proportionate increase in marginal cost is larger in the South, and so output and total employment contract proportionately more there. This is consistent with the idea that one purpose of the national minimum wage is to reduce the cost advantage of firms located in low-wage regions of the country. It is also consistent with Silberman and Durden's (1976, p. 325) finding that Southern congressmen are less likely than other congressmen to vote in favor of a minimum-wage hike.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes a simple two-sector labor market model which is used to guide the empirical work. Sections III and IV report the empirical findings for the covered and uncovered sectors. Section V uses the theoretical model to interpret the results. Section VI contains the concluding remarks.
II. Two-Sector Model
The following two-sector model of the low-wage labor market is used to illustrate the restrictions being tested and to guide the empirical work. The model consists of two labor demand schedules (one for each sector), an equilibrium condition connecting the minimum wage and the competitively determined uncovered-sector wage, and an aggregate labor supply relationship. Formally, the model is: labor demand (covered): NC = DC(W/W2, XC), Dc < 0, 
III. The Covered Sector
The first step in the empirical work is to estimate the demand equation (la) to get regional estimates of the covered-sector demand elasticity, ec.l The data are annual observations on employment elasticity. In addition, the observed elasticity of the covered-sector wage with respect to the minimum wage overestimates the share of minimum-wage grade labor in total labor costs. Below, evidence will be presented that el is only slightly underestimated.
To focus attention on economics the less important technical details of the regressions are put in Appendix B. The results in tables 1 and 2 are from distributed lag regressions of the logs of covered-sector employment and average hourly earnings, n and wc, on the log of the minimum wage, w, the control wage, W2, and the cyclical index, z. The control wage is the log of average hourly earnings, all manufacturing, net of wages in the four low-wage industries; the cyclical variable is the log of the FRB index of industrial production. The F-tests in table 1 indicate that the distributed lag coefficients on the minimum wage are significant as a group in nearly all of the equations. Now consider the long-run elasticities reported in table 2. As theory predicts, the sign of the minimum-wage effect is negative in all of the employment equations and positive in all but one wage equation. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect displays important regional variation. The disemployment effect appears to be negligible in the Northeast and upper Midwest, and it seems to be rather important through the South, the Southwest, and the Pacific coast. Also, the elasticities of employment and the average wage with respect to the minimum wage are consistent with one another, in the sense that, wherever the effect on the wage is small, so is the effect on employment.
To Comparing these long-run effects to regional data on the wage distribution in the covered sector suggests that the major impact of the minimum wage is the scale or output effect. To see this, consider the 1964 wage distribution displayed in table 3. These data were 4 Throughout this paper regional dependent variables are regressed on national variables. This is due to data limitations, but a strong case can be made for this practice even if regional data were available. Truly exogenous variables are driven by broad economy-wide forces and should not contain endogenous local fluctuations. For the quarterly agricultural regressions of Section IV it was possible to compute regional agricultural prices but only on an annual basis. Quarterly models with these prices repeated four times gave much lower fs than the reported equations. Evidently, the time variation is more important than the regional variation. 6 Many of these studies use the ratio of teenage to adult employment as the dependent variable, and so they estimate only a pure substitution effect (Welch 1974 ). This study estimates a combined scale and substitution effect. collected in a special survey of firms by the Department of Labor. Define low-wage workers to be those within 10 percent of the minimum wage of $1.25 (10 percent was about the average percentage increase in the minimum wage in the early 1960s). Then the share of low-wage labor in total labor costs is 0.14 in the Northeast and 0.32 in the South. These cost shares indicate that, if firms held employment constant, then a 10 percent minimum-wage hike would drive up labor costs by 1.4 and 3.2 percent in these two regions. Furthermore, if firms respond to the wage hike by contracting low-and high-wage employment equiproportionately, then the average wages in the North and South would increase by 1.4 and 3.2 percent. According to the regressions in table 2, the average wages actually increase by 1.5 percent in the North and 3.2 percent in the South. (These figures are 10 times the unweighted mean elasticity for the two northern regions and three southern regions.) A similar agreement between the cost share and the wage elasticity exists in the North Central region and in the West. The data appear to say that covered-sector firms respond to a minimum-wage hike by taking steps to reduce total labor input and that both groups of workers suffer equiproportionate disemployment. Furthermore, since the substitution effect appears to be small relative to the scale effect, the estimated disemployment elasticities are close to the true demand elasticities for low-wage labor.
IV. The Uncovered Sector
The purpose of this section is to estimate the minimum-wage effect on uncovered (agricultural) employment and wages. The reduced-form equations (2a) and (2b) give the specifications. Specifically, the logs of agricultural employment and wages are regressed on the minimum wage, the control wage, the general price level, and the shift variables appearing in ( Divisions (1966, p. 30, table 12 ). Michigan and Wiscon-Two conclusions are apparent from the regressions. First, the significance tests in table 4 confirm the well-known fact that aggregate cyclical forces play a strong role in the determination of agricultural labor supply. According to the U.S. long-run elasticities in table 5, a 10 percent increase in industrial production is associated with an 11.3 percent decrease in hired farm employment and a 2.9 percent increase in the hired farm wage. This is important because it indicates that there are indeed sizable labor flows between agriculture and the covered sector.
Second, and most important, changes in the minimum wage do affect agricultural employment and wages. The F-tests in table 4 show that as a group the distributed lag coefficients on the minimum wage are significant at 10 percent in five of 10 employment equations and in eight of 10 wage equations. Note that in table 5 the long-run U.S. employment elasticity of -.18 is insignificant, but the wage elasticity of -.08 is significant. The latter measurement indicates that for the entire United States a minimum-wage hike tends to depress the uncovered-sector wage. This finding is consistent with both Mincer's and Gardner's results.
Examination of the regional results in table 5 suggests that there are important regional differences in the welfare effects of the minimum wage. Notice that the effect on the uncovered-sector wage is significantly positive in the New England, Middle Atlantic, and West North Central regions; it is significantly negative in the South Atlantic and Pacific regions. Thus, as indicated by (3a), the wage in the uncovered sector can indeed rise or fall after a minimum-wage hike in the covered sector. Viewed in isolation, however, the uncoveredsector results are insufficient to verify the model. Indeed, if the hypothesized economic mechanisms are really at work, then the absolute disemployment elasticities from Section III should be largest in the regions where the uncovered-sector wage falls.
V. Sectoral Comparisons
Consider the inequality (3a). If the demand elasticity ec is less than the turnover parameter 6, then after a minimum-wage hike the flow of labor out of the uncovered sector increases the wage there; if ec is greater than 6, then the flow of labor into the uncovered sector decreases the wage. Therefore, if there is small regional variation in sin are in the East North Central region, and their agricultural minimum wages possibly could explain the results for that region. Consider, though, the fact that California accounts for 88 percent of agricultural employment in the Pacific region, and it turns out that after a hike in the U.S. minimum wage the agricultural wage declines in the Pacific region. The skill-group aggregation in the uncovered sector data can account for the apparent conflict between theory and panel B of figure 1. When the low-skill wage changes in the uncovered sector, there are scale and substitution effects. As noted before and as proved in Appendix A, the larger is the substitution effect relative to the scale effect, the smaller is the observed (absolute) employment elasticity relative to the true proportionate change in low-wage labor. Evidently, the elasticity of substitution between low-and high-skill labor in agriculture is large enough to make this skill-group aggregation suppress the uncovered employment effect to an undetectable level. Notice that this is the reverse of the situation in the covered sector. As was noted in Section III, in the covered sector the scale effect dominates the substitution effect; in contrast, in the uncovered sector the substitution effect dominates the scale effect.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
This paper examines the covariation over regions in the effects of the minimum wage on wages and employment in the covered and uncovered sectors. Its major empirical finding is that the pattern of results is consistent with theory. Specifically, after a minimum-wage hike the uncovered-sector wage increases in the five regions with relatively small covered-sector demand elasticities: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, and East South Central; it decreases in the four regions with the relatively large covered-sector demand elasticities: South Atlantic, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. In addition, Mincer's and Gardner's earlier work suggesting that the uncovered-sector wage decreases in the entire United States is consistent with these findings, for their results are dominated by the four large regions (in terms of low-wage employment) in which the uncovered-sector wage falls. This paper's results have some bearing on the issue of welfare effects of the minimum wage. It seems fair to conclude that the minimum wage increases the well-being of all low-wage workers in the New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, and East South Central regions. In the remaining regions, however, the minimum wage increases the well-being of only those workers having covered-sector employment.
with quarterly data the temporal aggregation problems are absent. Io purge the series of seasonal effects, each regression included seasonal dummies and the products of seasonals with trend.
Serial Correlation
In the annual covered-sector regressions a first-order Cochrane-()rcutt correction was used; in the quarterly uncovered-sector regressions ad hoc prefilters were used together with fifth-order Cochrane-Orcutt.
Exogeneity
Table Bi reports the outcome of batteries of Sims's (1972 Sims's ( , 1977 exogeneity test. The test consists of the appropriate F-or t-test on lead coefficients. The paucity of rejections indicates no serious problems with a lack of exogeneity in either set of results. Since lead values of w and w2 enter the covered-sector equations for other reasons, the test's power is obviously low in that set of results.
